

November 18, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: DON RUMSFELD  
FROM: DONALD S. LOWITZ  
RE: DOD Posture Statement FY 1977

Attached is a November 17 memorandum concerning the FY'77 posture statement and Latimer's covering statement to me. Latimer has had the major responsibility for this statement under Schlesinger and his counterpart has had the same under previous Secretaries.

The statement is in the advanced stage of development but can still be sufficiently rewritten to bear your impact. See paragraph two of the memorandum.

A major question is raised by paragraph four of the memo. This requires discussions between Kissinger and yourself.

Also, you must decide whether you continue using Dr. Kaufmann, of MIT, as the major author of the statement.

This matter is tentatively on your schedule for Monday, November 24, 1975.

Attachment






OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

17 November 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR Don Lowitz

FROM: Thomas K. Latimer 

Attached is a memorandum from Bill Kaufmann explaining a little about the posture statement and where it stands. Please note paragraph four which could cause more of a problem than anything else. A copy of the latest draft of the posture statement as it stands now should have been given to Dan Murdoch Saturday by Lieutenant Colonel Dick Boverie of the NSC staff. We provided him a copy to assist in the preparation of Mr. Rumsfeld for his confirmation hearings.

Attachment





OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

17 November 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. Latimer

FROM: Dr. Kaufmann

SUBJECT: Posture Statement

There are a number of issues about the FY 1977 Posture Statement that the new Sec Def should have an opportunity to resolve. They are:

1. Responsibility for the document. Since its inception, the statement has been controlled out of the Secretary's immediate office: by Henry Glass, William Baroody, Robert Murray, and myself. McNamara personally reviewed it; Nitze kept an eye on it for Clifford. I don't know how the system worked under Laird. Murray revised the last Laird statement for Richardson with assistance from Henry Glass and me. I supervised and wrote the policy sections of the last two statements (FY 1975 and FY 1976) with substantial assistance from Henry Glass.

If the new Sec Def does not have anyone to run the statement for him, he could turn to PA&E (Sullivan would probably welcome the responsibility) or to Bob Murray. Henry Glass is still around, but probably shouldn't be asked because of his precarious health.

2. Character of the document. A series of formal documents in the 1960's formed the basis for the statement; consequently, the author's job was largely one of editing and integrating these memoranda. The memoranda no longer exist, so that writing the statement has become more onerous. Under Schlesinger, we farmed out most of the sections to the bureaucracy. However, Glass personally did the strategic threat and program sections, and I wrote the overview and the "policy" sections on strategic and general purpose forces. I had planned to follow the same pattern for FY 1977, with these differences: give PA&E the responsibility for the strategic threat and programs; reduce the length to about 200 pages. Since Schlesinger's departure, I have asked ISA to produce the overview and PA&E the "policy" sections on strategic and general purpose forces. I continue the process of supervising, integrating, and editing.

We should have a complete but very rough statement by next week. It will be what I think of as a bureaucratic statement. The new Sec Def may want to accept it as is. Alternatively, he may wish to have the overview and policy sections rewritten to reflect his own views. He could also submit a short statement of his own and leave the bureaucratic



report essentially untouched. I have deliberately refrained from putting any personal stamp on it so that he would not be saddled with Schlesinger's views or style.

3. Scheduling of the document. The current schedule calls for circulating the document for comment on December 17. A semi-final draft would go out for a numbers check on January 9, and the final statement should be ready for printing by the third week in January. We can meet this set of deadlines without any difficulty if we stick with the bureaucratic draft.

Delays could result from the following: major changes in policy and programs as a result of revisions in the FY 1977 defense budget; revision of statement to reflect the view of the new Sec Def: differences between Defense and State on national security policy and its public formation. The new Sec Def should be aware of these possibilities. He may want to review the deadlines both internally and with the Armed Services Committees.

4. Section 812. This is the section of the defense authorization act which requires Sec Def, after consultation with Sec State, to report on the foreign policy and military posture of the U.S.: how they relate, and their justification. To my knowledge, there has been no discussion with State on this requirement. Schlesinger had planned to raise the subject with Kissinger and use Section I (the overview) of the Defense Report to satisfy the law. I am not sure whether he ever intended to look at what I planned to write.

ISA is now drafting Section I, but without any policy guidance and without any formal consultation with State. The new Sec Def will have to decide on how much consultation to engage in, and on how to respond to demands from State both to participate in the drafting of Section I and to modify its contents. He should be aware, in this connection, that drafts of the posture statement circulate to State, NSC, OMB, and ACDA as well as to all major offices in OSD and the Services. During the last two years, I took the responsibility of deciding how much of the comments and criticisms should be accepted. Schlesinger did not involve himself at all.

